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WAITING WITH BROTHER THOMAS 
Christopher L. Sagers· 
In this Essay, Christopher Sagers argues that those schools of thought that 
could be called "doubtful"-that is, those predicated on suspicion of belief to 
some degree-share a range of similarities and, more importantly, are attacked 
through a set of common criticisms. He argues that the fundamental criticism of 
these "doubtful" schools of thought-that doubt leads us to nihilism and therefore 
must be bad-is a non sequitur. Furthermore, he continues, we reject doubt not 
because it is bad, but because it is difficult. Ultimately, he suggests ways to face 
the problems of nihilism or, rather, ways of understanding them as other than 
problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Unless I see the mark of the nails on his hands, unless I put my finger 
into the place where the nails were, and my hand into his side, I will 
never believe it. 
-The Apostle Thomas1 
• Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC. I wish to thank Mark Brandon, Daniel 
Farber, Stanley Fish, Larry Mohr, Richard Posner, Pierre Schlag, Brian Simpson, and most espe· 
cially Lane Sagers for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Jeff Smith and the two Jims (Dobkin 
and Sandman) for support and encouragement. 
1. 	 John 20:25. 
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Be prompt and be fair. If you are right, that is a bonus. Leave the 
brilliance to us. 
-Hon. Clay Legrand, Iowa Supreme Court2 
Everybody hates an agnostic.3 Agnostics drone on with their frus­
trating doubts about everything, the most rigorous of them denouncing 
anything anyone else has ever done because it all rests on foundations of 
belief. A peculiar rash of agnostic talk has invaded the legal academy in 
recent years, manifesting itself in various strains of doubtful scholarship 
such as pragmatism,4 critical legal studies (CLS),5 the various critical social 
2. Telephone Interview with retired Justice Clay Legrand, Iowa Supreme Court (July 15, 
1998) (describing advice Justice Legrand gave to newly appointed Iowa trial court judges). 
3. By "agnostic," I mean simply a person who thinks that we cannot "know" things-facts 
or values-in any strict sense. I mean nothing in particular about God per se, although an agnos· 
tic, as I use the term, would of course doubt the existence of a god. 
A point that will become important later on is that agnosticism is an epistemic claim rather 
than an ontological claim. That is, the agnostic merely doubts that we can know things; agnos· 
ticism as such makes no claims about what is. Note that this definition makes agnosticism impor· 
tantly different than skepticism. The skeptic on my account does make ontological claims-that 
things do not exist, that they are not true, etc. 
Incidentally, the agnostic makes no claim that agnosticism is "true"-only that we do not 
seem to be able to know whether we can know things. I admit somewhat humbly that there is a 
point anterior to agnosticism that deserves examination-how we can "know" that we do not 
know. I think, though, chat the question is probably irrelevant, for it does not matter to the 
agnostic if agnosticism is wrong. Thus, I think that the agnostic can doubt agnosticism. Agnos· 
ticism loses none of its usefulness if in fact we can know things because we have yet to figure out 
how we can know, if in face such a thing is possible. Thus, we remain in waiting-waiting for 
objective truth to make itself manifest. In the meanwhile, we are stuck with doubt and, in my 
view, we do not have much choice but to make the best of it. For a further discussion, see infra 
Part 11.B. 
4. Pragmatists generally reject the hope of "knowledge" or systematic understanding of the 
world. Richard Rorty, for example, rejects the view that there are "essences" or core principles 
underlying life. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 189-98 (1989). 
Similarly, Thomas Grey writes that a pragmatist is "the kind of theorist who constantly puts in 
question the status of theory itself and its relation to practice." Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other 
Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1990). 
Pragmatism is currently undergoing an impressive renaissance in American legal thought, 
returning from near death and obscurity to become a leading philosophical alternative of the 
1990s. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, JOO YALE L.J. 409, 409-10 (1990) (noting 
that, as of the mid-1980s, many scholars had pronounced pragmatism dead, but that by 1990 
it had sprung to life); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1 (1996). 
5. See generall:y MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1-14 (1987) 
(summarizing the development and general contours of Critical Legal Studies (CLS)). CLS gen· 
erally adopted the indeterminacy thesis of legal realism, but went beyond realism to question why 
law was indeterminate. According to CLS, legal rules are bad predictors of outcomes because (1) 
the rules, by their nature, produce unintended consequences in some cases, and ( 2) the rules are 
always in conflict with at least someone's extralegal values. See id. at 40-45 (describing the rules· 
standards conflict); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
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theories,6 and, more recently, the loosely bound "school" or perhaps 
"collection" of writers who sometimes call themselves "postmodernists."7 
CLS moved well beyond realism in attempting to live with doubt. The realists as a group 
maintained hope that, on the far end of their critique of formalism, there would still be answers to 
be found; in this way, CLS scholars felt that many realists were hardly more than formalists them· 
selves. See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and 
Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2215-19 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). CLS, however, did not attempt. to provide a replacement 
for the assumptions it purported to debunk; rather, the goal of the CLS scholar has been continu­
ally to remind lawyers and scholars that the problems posed by realism are not subject to real, 
black and white answers. See DUXBURY, supra, at 427-28. This goal, however, has led many 
within CLS to the difficult and troubling impasse that is the subject of this Essay, and their 
attempts to overcome it have led them to the sort of rationalizations to which I object. See infra 
notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
6. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 
(Kimberle Williams Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY); FEMINIST 
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (0. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). These critical theories differ from 
CLS--their immediate predecessor-in their approach to doubt. For example, much of critical 
race theory (CRT) adopts the CLS indeterminacy thesis and its doubtful critique of liberal rights 
discourse, but nevertheless it remains important within CRT to find answers to the resulting ques· 
tions about normativity and progress. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. Similarly, 
radical feminists reject liberal notions of "rights" and "the state" on the view that the state is not 
an objective, neutral actor, but in fact that objectivity and neutrality are merely tools by which a 
fundamentally male state maintains an illusion of fairness and thereby maintains its power. See 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru­
dence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). Thus, critical social theorists view doubt not so much as an inescap· 
able endpoint, but rather as a tool to challenge dominant views. They generally imagine a later 
endpoint that is not doubtful-for example, a jurisprudence informed by feminist values. See infra 
notes 34-42 and accompanying text. 
7. Postmodernists would probably reject even this attempt to identify legal post· 
modernism as an entity. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 190 (1995) (stating that to attempt to characterize post· 
modernism or capture its core concepts "is contrary to postmodernism, in that [it) falls prey to 
modernism"); Pierre Schlag, Stances, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1059, 1061 (1991) ("Both in the 
claims that postmodernists 'are committed' and that they are committed to a 'view,' there is already 
a logic that constructs postmodernists as persons who take stances . ..." The claims "raise[) an 
intractable problem of privilege among competing positions."). For what it's worth, one scholar 
has attempted to isolate certain convictions widely held by postmodernists, a list of which serves 
to give at least a flavor of the scholarship: 
( l) The self is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-generating entity; it is purely a 
social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation. (2) There are no foundational princi· 
pies from which other assertions can be derived; hence, certainty as the result of either 
empirical verification or deductive reasoning is impossible. (3) There can be no such 
thing as knowledge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always belief and can apply 
only to the context within which it is asserted. (4) Because language is socially and 
culturally constituted, it is inherently incapable of representing or corresponding to real­
ity; hence all propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social 
constructions. 
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 
65 S. CALL. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992). It is not terribly clear how postmodernism differs from 
CLS and its progeny. Some apparently use the term to encompass CLS and similar approaches, 
see, e.g., Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modem Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to 
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Agnostics are hardly new to legal scholarship, of course; the frightfully 
misnamed legal realists left a legacy of doubt that remains with even most 
mainstream academics today.8 Still, today's doubtful scholarship has in turn 
drawn intense criticism.9 This is hardly surprising-after all, there doesn't 
seem to be much for law professors to do if there is no such thing as a 
superior policy choice. Given this recent insurgence of agnostic views, and 
the discord they have brought about, it might be useful to examine the 
basic commitment uniting them-doubt. 
This Essay basically rides two horses. · First, it seeks to show that the 
criticisms routinely raised against doubtful legal scholarship are not very 
compelling. It seems to me that criticism of doubt is usually predicated on 
a lot of gloom and doom-a litany of bad consequences or apparent difficul­
ties that do not .necessarily prove much about doubt per se except that it 
can seem oftentimes awkward and unlikable. I think it will be useful to try 
to collect as many of these various criticisms as possible in one place and 
Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 354 (1995) ("It would ... be a mistake to conclude that 
jurisprudential postmodernism is something that is fundamentally different from jurisprudential 
modernism ...."), while others use it to refer to an independent philosophy, see DUXBURY, supra 
note 5, at 422. Indeed, a chief difficulty in the debate over postmodernism has concerned what 
the word means. See Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 
577, 577-78 (1991). For the argument that CLS and postmodernism are more than trivially dis­
tinct, see DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 422-28. 
8. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 467 (1988) 
(arguing that "[American legal scholars) are all realists now"). Realism was perhaps the best rec­
ognized recent occurrence of legal doubt, but was by no means the first. Brian Simpson traces 
legal "iconoclasm" to much earlier roots. See A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 
58 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 828-31 ( 1990) (finding evidence of legal doubt from as early as 1345 and 
suggesting that doubt in essence has remained unchanged); see also Don Herzog, As Many as Six 
Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 609 (1987) (arguing that CLS merely 
restates very old criticisms). 
Incidentally, the legal realists are misnamed because they should not be confused with meta­
physical realists-those who believe that things exist. The legal realists' metaphysical outlook 
seems to have been, if anything, the opposite of that held by metaphysical realists. 
9. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1986) 
(arguing that CLS destroys without providing a replacement for what it has destroyed and is thus 
"politically unappealing and politically irresponsible"); Jamieson, supra note 7, at 577-83 (arguing 
that postmodernism cannot be a useful legal philosophy because its basic tenets are contrary to 
theory-building); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Tum in Modem Theory: A Tum far the 
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1989) (arguing that the new doubtful scholarship has prema­
turely interred metaphysics); Dennis Patterson, The Pooeny of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the 
Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. l, 3 ( 1993) (arguing that doubt leads to an infinite 
regress of interpretations and ultimately leads to hopelessness). 
A particularly bitter and now infamous attack came early on, from Dean Paul Carrington. He 
wrote that law professors who embrace "nihilism and its lesson that who decides is everything, and 
principle is nothing but cosmetic ... [have) an ethical duty to depart the law school, perhaps to 
seek a place elsewhere in the academy." Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 222, 227 (1984). 
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assess their strengths and weaknesses. Second, and I think more interest­
ing, this Essay seeks to show that the fact that these various criticisms of 
doubt are unavailing, and therefore that we are left with nihilism, is just 
not such a big deal. The problem is not nihilism, but anterior assumptions 
of what we need to be able to know and do to survive, to be happy, or 
whatever. 10 
In what follows I make a few reifications to which many will object. 
Most important, I speak of "agnosticism" in a way that is not terribly realis­
tic-I generally speak of it as if it were a single philosophical position, while 
in fact it is only one component of a number of views widely different both 
in their details and in their ultimate prescriptions. The point, however, is 
not to defend any of the particular schools manifesting some doubt, but 
rather to consider doubt generally and the problems it raises. Because in my 
view each of the doubtful branches of legal scholarship share basic com­
mitments in common with the others and, more importantly, raise common 
problems, it seems useful to speak of them as if they fell under one umbrella, 
which I shall call agnosticism or doubt. Furthermore, it seems to me incon­
sistent to doubt only some things (and thus the implicit view expressed 
in this Essay that the traditional fact-value distinction is unimportant). If 
we can't know even the most basic facts-whether we are currently 
dreaming, for example-then we are unlikely to do much better at knowing 
complicated subjective things like "right" and "wrong." A great deal of this 
Essay is taken up with my argument that once one adopts a basic doubtful 
approach to knowledge, it is more or less fruitless to try to rehabilitate one­
self and try to have faith in some things. Even if that claim is not accepted, 
I think it is generally the case that the nonagnostic criticisms that are my 
focus apply to incomplete doubt as well as to doubt of everything. For 
example, if one is doubtful only about rights or moral values, one is subject 
to the same objections of relativism and hopelessness as if he were more 
radically doubtful. 
One quite separate problem I would like to dispatch up front involves 
my use of the term "epistemic." I mean it as nothing more than a con­
10. This observation has been hinted at before, but l don't think anyone has seriously con· 
sidered what it means. Joseph Singer recognized that "[r)ather than explain how we can reform 
legal theory to solve the problem of nihilism," he would rather "explain why l do not think there 
is a problem." Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1984). Unfortunately, Singer's explanation for why there is no problem depends 
on his unsatisfying claim that, notwithstanding the fact that "[l)aw and morality have no rational 
foundation," we can nevertheless "develop[) passionate moral and political commitments." Id. at 
8-9. Singer was apparently the first legal philosopher to recognize that the real problems of doubt 
may not be nihilism. However, in my view, and for the reasons presented in this Essay, l think he 
completely failed to understand why. 
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venient shorthand expression for what is going on in our minds. In fact, 
the only context in which it will arise concerns our capacity. Thus, it is of 
precisely no concern to me what "knowledge" is or might be; when I say 
that agnosticism is an epistemic view, I do not mean it is a theory of 
knowledge. I mean only that it is a claim about what our brains can do and 
as I have already pointed out below the line, not one that I think is true. 11 I 
claim only that whatever knowing is, we can't yet do it in any very absolute 
12 
sense. 
Finally, in contrast to the stubbornly dreary, negative tenor of most 
doubtful scholarship, I am determined that this Essay remain cheerful in 
tone. Our arrival at doubt does not reflect any underlying hopelessness of 
life or anything of the sort. Any sense of hopelessness is merely the product 
of a mismatch between our expectations for theory and philosophy, on the 
one hand, and our nature, on the other hand. To that end, I should add 
here a cautionary word: by no means do I envision a life without hope, nor 
do I intend to legitimate any awful activity or misdeed. A careless read of 
this Essay will leave one with the impression that I favor complete immor­
ality or anarchy or that I am just bent on wrecking tradition for no good 
reason. One might also consider me quite a conservative, in that the 
inability of knowing right from wrong would tend to render political change 
pointless. But, in fact, for purposes of this Essay I only care about one thing: 
our epistemic nature and how it affects our various intellectual projects. It 
is merely my sense that the simple agnostic observation-that we cannot 
know things in any strict sense-has larger implications than is commonly 
recognized, and that it cannot be refuted by the various claims that are 
commonly made against it. 
Part I of this Essay examines agnostic scholarship and considers why 
so many doubtful scholars have attempted to construct systematic answers 
to the problems of nihilism. It provides a brief explanation of the main 
problems of agnosticism, from which I hope it will be apparent that the 
similarities amongst the doubtful schools of thought are at least as inter­
esting as their differences. This collection of problems, incidentally, is what 
I shall mean when I use the term "nihilism." Part I then examines 
11. See supra note 3. 
12. See supra note 3. Thus, though Rorty distrusts "epistemology," he is not talking about 
what I'm doing. In fact, I think his purpose and mine are basically the same. He believes that 
what is interesting about the way we think (according to him, "hermeneutically") are the con· 
clusions we might draw from it about our particular reality rather than how we can build from it a 
method for finding truth. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 
357-59 (1979). My goal is similar-I am interested in the agnostic observation not for purposes 
of what it tells us about truth per se, but for what it tells us about our present circumstances and 
the world we face. 
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the various attempts by doubtful scholars and others to overcome these 
problems. It will seem obvious to some that pure agnosticism must be over­
come by such systematic answers, or else we will have failed as philosophers 
and will be left with nihilism. My view, however, is that pure agnosticism is 
avoided not because it is bad, but because it is difficult. 
Part 11 faces the first major class of arguments against doubt-those 
that face doubt "on the merits," which is to say that they· attempt to show 
that doubt is wrong, for analytical reasons, regardless of its consequences. 
They include the so-called "transcendental" arguments and various 
attempts to approximate knowledge by doing away with a need for abso­
lutes. Part lll considers the second major class of nonagnostic arguments, 
which take the form of the reductio ad absurdum. I think the reductio is 
generally less well-considered than the more complex arguments discussed 
in Part 11, but it is also more important, for reasons that are made clear 
below. My general response to the reductio is that just because we want the 
world to be a certain way does not mean that it will be. Thus, whether or 
not we are left with anything on the other side of the doubtful critique is 
not really relevant; I think our goal should not be to overcome nihilism, but 
to understand and make the best of it. 
Finally, Part IV suggests an approach to the problems of agnostic­
ism, or rather a means of understanding them as other than problems. The 
key, I think, is to recognize that the real difficulty is not nihilism in itself. 
Rather, the problem is a preconceived set of anterior expectations that 
require, for their realization, a set of nonnihilistic circumstances. In other 
words, we mistakenly assume that it is necessary to our "success" that we be 
able to explain things, to come up with right answers, and so on. Thus, 
rather than pose a solution that will help us to defeat nihilism, Part IV con­
siders whether we can learn to live with it (or whether we already know 
how to do that). The opposition to doubt flows from fears of nihilism 
predicated on these anterior assumptions and, in particular, on a miscon­
ceived notion of the relation between theory and reality. My sense is that if 
we discard these misconceptions, nihilism will seem a less-significant 
demon. 
I. CLEARING THE UNDERBRUSH 
Even if we accept doubt as an epistemic outlook, we must continue 
to make personal choices and policy choices. Thus, practical reality seems 
to demand that we find some means to make such decisions. Unfortunately, 
that means often seems simply unavailable given the commitments already 
held by the agnostic. The doubter seeking to work out a systematic phi­
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losophy based on agnostic commitments thus often paints himself into the 
tight corner of nihilism-his doubt has allowed him critically to examine 
existing views, but, having discarded them as inconsistent with doubt, he is 
left with nothing. Thus, as Judge Posner said of pragmatism, doubt merely 
"clears the underbrush; it does not plant the forest." 13 
A. Difficulties of the Doubter 
It is useful to begin by explaining exactly what I understand to be the 
problems of the agnostic. Several difficulties arise if one logically follows 
the essential agnostic claim to its conclusion-for example, if one begins 
with the conviction that we cannot know anything in the strict sense, 
then it is hard to see how we can engage in moral criticism or policy 
discourse in the traditional manner. The various relevant problems can be 
classed together in a group called, to pick a word, nihilism. First let us dis­
cuss exactly what they might be. As these problems have been canvassed 
extensively elsewhere, the discussion here will be brief. 
The first and most intuitively obvious problem is that agnosticism 
seems morally hollow. At least according to traditional notions, moral 
criticism requires an epistemic commitment not really compatible with pure 
doubt-as Joseph Singer put it, the agnostic doubts whether "reason can 
adjudicate value conflicts."14 The agnostic is likely to believe that whatever 
morality there might be is contingent on geography and history, is sub­
jective, and so on. The problem, then, is that the agnostic cannot really say 
when things are "good" or "bad" or "right" or "wrong"-at least not in any 
absolute sense, and absolutes are pretty important to the agnostic. 15 This 
has been a common criticism of doubtful legal scholarship and has driven a 
great deal of the current animosity towards CLS, the critical social theories, 
legal pragmatism, and so on. 16 
Second, agnosticism seems to make policymaking basically hopeless. 
How can lawmakers make a "right" decision for their constituents if there is 
no such thing as a "right" decision? How can a judge possibly anticipate the 
consequences of her decision in order to weigh its wisdom as a policy 
choice? Will not a policy decision necessarily be an impossible compromise 
amongst a basically infinite range of potential choices, each of which has a 
13. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 
1670 (1990). 
14. Singer, supra note 10, at 8. 
15. See infra Part II.A. 
16. See sources cited supra note 9. 
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precisely equal likelihood of being "right"?17 It seems that the inherent sub­
jectivity of doubt makes policy essentially a shot in the dark that can 
neither be objectively approached from the beginning nor objectively 
assessed once accomplished. 
Similarly, it has been pointed out that by doubting the objectivity of 
morals and such, the agnostic wastefully disavows his own value judgments. 
This is first of all psychologically damaging for the agnostic-he must live 
in a world in which he cannot trust any of his own feelings or decide 
whether any of his own deeds is good or bad. Second, the loss is wasteful 
because the agnostic, as a member of our democratic community, can con­
tribute nothing to the general cause of public debate.18 
On a related but basically trivial point, agnosticism seems to make our 
other everyday decisions look a little silly. Taken to its absurd extreme, a 
commitment to rigorous doubt would require that we doubt everything-for 
example, that the sun will rise in the East tomorrow morning, or that car­
rots will taste good the next time (or that they did the last time, for that 
matter), and so on, so that an agnostic true to his own principles would be 
best advised to stay at home under the covers. (Witness John Barth's very 
funny account of a man paralyzed at a train station because all alternative 
destinations struck him as equally desirable.) 19 Of course, no one doubts 
everything and no one could. We operate every day on an apparently infi­
nite number of assumptions about the world, at varying levels of con­
sciousness, and without them we would be hopelessly a-sea. One might ask 
whether our basically belief-ridden state is compatible with agnosticism and 
whether it undermines that viewpoint-that is a subject for consideration 
later on.20 
Finally, and probably most controversially, I think traditional notions 
of theory are frustrated by doubt. By "theory," I mean something very broad. 
To borrow a phrase, I intend theory to mean attempts to use the world's 
redundancies to explain the world simply.21 That is, a theory implicitly 
claims that there are principles or commonalities underlying some certain 
class of events that can explain the broader system of those events in com­
17. Under that view, interestingly enough, the likelihood of any choice being "right" 
is precisely zero. See FREDERICK MOSTELLER ET AL., PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLI· 
CATIONS 251 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that the probability of randomly selecting any particular 
point along a continuum of continuous random variables is zero). 
18. See Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1062-63. 
19. See JOHN BARTH, THE END OF THE ROAD 322-37 (Anchor Books ed. 1988). Barth 
aptly calls the man's condition "cosmopsis"-literally, the state of seeing everything. Id. 
20. See infra Part Ill. 
21. See Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 21 J. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 23, 
27 (1963 ). 
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pact terms. A theory, then, is perhaps like an algorithm that purports to 
capture some of the underlying structure of reality, or like a recipe that can 
explain in brief the operation or making of something larger and more 
complex than the recipe itself. Incidentally, when seen in this way the 
term "theory" encompasses a number of things we don't normally think of 
as theories-legal doctrine, for example. As this is a point of some signifi­
cance to this Essay, it receives a somewhat more detailed treatment here.22 
Theories, from the agnostic perspective, suffer from a whole host 
of problems, all of them calling into question the reliability of our observa­
tions and the conclusions we draw from them. Most simply, there is a logi­
cal disconnect between observation and reality that jeopardizes our ability 
to identify even those basic relationships upon which theory seeks to build. 
If a theory is the use of the world's redundancies to explain the world sim­
ply, an initial question is whether we have the cerebral wattage to identify 
the redundancies properly. It is unclear whether we can reliably identify 
the similarities that could render facts "redundant." 
A closely related problem is that theories contain an unresolveable 
chicken-and-egg confusion: our theories might actually be driving our 
observations. As Pierre Schlag has explained, there is a serious circularity 
in the basic argument that "I observe X causing Y, and therefore X causes 
Y. "23 That is, if we hypothesize that X causes Y, then it may be only natural 
that things Y always seem to follow our observation of things X. On the 
other hand, if we hypothesize that Y causes X, our observations might be 
substantially different-even opposite. So, the question is whether our 
observations occur independently of what we hope to observe. As Francis 
Bacon long ago put it: 
The human understanding, once it has adopted opinions, either 
because they were already accepted and believed, or because it likes 
them, draws everything else to support and agree with them. And 
though it may meet a greater number and weight of contrary 
instances, it will, with great and harmful prejudice, ignore or con­
demn or exclude them by introducing some distinction, in order that 
the authority of those earlier assumptions may remain intact and 
unharmed.24 
22. For an explanation of the significance, see infra Part lV.B. 
23. See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 900-02 (1997) 
(explaining that, in theory making, "[a) certain pattern is abstracted from the data .... [and) then 
projected back onto imagined reified enabling agencies-such as 'doctrines' and 'principles' [and 
these) enabling agencies are then ... quite fortuitously ... found to be at once generative of and 
constraining upon" those same data). 
24. FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM 0RGANUM 57 (Peter Urbach & John Gibson eds. & trans., 
Open Court 1994) (1620). 
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A more fundamental difficulty with theories could be called the "struc­
ture problem." This is best understood if we think of theory as something 
like an outline. An outline restates the structure of the thing in question 
and makes simplified representations about its content. It is an attempt to 
represent the thing without simply reproducing the whole thing. A trivial 
agnostic observation is that an outline may be incomplete-we can never 
tell if we have gone into enough detail in an outline to really have reached 
the atomic level of analysis. If that were the only problem, we might think 
it possible- to perfect the outline by merely making it more detailed, and, in 
any case, we should be able to make it complete enough that whatever 
minor ways in which it disagrees with reality are so inconsequential as to 
make the outline perfect for practical purposes. But the problem with the 
outline is not that it may not contain every necessary element. The prob­
lem is that, along with its claim about the content of the phenomenon 
under consideration, the outline contains an implicit claim about the 
phenomenon's organization. An outline necessarily contemplates that some 
particular set of facts is organized in a pyramid or hierarchy of components 
that are related to one another only through the hierarchy. There is the 
title, which is the most general statement of commonality of the 
components, and then there are the headings, which are the next level, and 
so on. For this reason, an outline would clearly be inadequate to explain, 
say, international warfare. Such a phenomenon cannot be understood as 
a pyramid-like outline because the relevant facts have complicated 
interrelationships that cannot be characterized by simple vertical chains of 
decreasing specificity. In other words, the problem with the outline is that 
it hypothesizes an inherent set of relationships that is anterior even to our 
observations-when we set about trying to make an outline, we have 
assumed a certain organization even before we begin. 
Finally, the most fundamental element of the "structure" problem is 
that the outline, to continue the example, assumes that there are "atoms," 
so to speak, to be found. That is, it quietly assumes that, at the fundamen­
tal level of analysis, there are finite, identifiable points of truth on which 
the outline can be built. We assume that our categorization of observations 
into such "facts" is not arbitrary or questionable, but simply a realistic 
understanding of the units of reality. 
I think theory generally is quite like the outline. While a theory does 
not necessarily have to be a hierarchical pyramid, it does make organiza­
tional claims about reality. Consider a simple theory: "When an object falls 
in a vacuum, it accelerates at a constant rate." This claim is a theory 
because it makes a generalized argument about the redundancies of some 
class of events, and the argument is thought to explain every set of facts 
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that falls within the class. This particular theory contains obvious claims 
about the factual content of the phenomenon under consideration, and such 
claims can be measured with great precision in replications of the experi­
ment. But notice that the theory also contains subtle claims about the 
organization of those facts, including the most basic claim that the "facts" 
themselves exist as finite, atomic-level organizational units. First of all, 
there is the most general claim about commonality-that there is a class of 
things called "matter." More specifically, the theory claims that all items 
within that class exist in space, that they are all acted upon by gravity, and 
so on. Incidentally, it is this structural component of theories that, if reli­
able, represents their most valuable contribution: They purport to allow us 
to predict, by extension, the operation of phenomena not observed in any 
particular experiment. We infer from our research that other phenomena 
captured within the theory will behave as the theory predicts, even though 
we have not directly observed them. 
Now consider a more complicated theory: "Humans on average tend to 
behave as rational maximizers and will make choices that pose the greatest 
value to them in terms of their own desires, taking into consideration all 
costs of such choices." Again, this is a theory because it attempts to isolate 
the controlling elements of some class of events-namely, human decision 
making-and therefore to restate the workings of those events in highly 
simplified form. Again, note how the theory subtly imposes structure on 
the relevant sets of facts that might not actually be there. The theory is an 
implicit claim that there is a class called humans who are in all relevant 
respects the same. All members of the class share a degree of self-interest, 
they satisfy it in similar ways, and want similar things. This is again a classi­
fication of things-the imposition of order on facts and an assumption that 
there are facts or "atoms," rather than a creation of such pigeonholes by our 
organizational faculties. Its value if reliable is that we could understand 
events without actually observing them. Thus arises the agnostic problem, 
however, if indeed the agnostic is right: we can't know if there really is such 
an underlying structure, we can't know how well we are able to make use of 
it if it exists, and we can't know how much if any reliability it might have. 
Thus, the structure problem with theories is not the minor one of our 
inability to squeeze everything into them, but the major one of our organiza­
tional assumptions. Even if there is some underlying substance or redun­
dancy, the elements of which we can adequately state, we seem able to 
theorize only in this one, structurally engrafted way-according to one 
general scheme of organization-and we cannot really know that the world 
is organized in that way. Morton Horwitz summarized this view as applied 
to legal scholarship when he said "[t)he subversive assault [on] traditional 
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theories of law" has caused doubtful scholars to "focus[] upon the classi­
fication and · categorization of ... phenomena and [to] conclud[e] 
that ... [b]ecause there are no 'natural classes,' the process of categorization 
and classification is a social creation, not an act reflecting some prior 
. . f 1125orgamzatton o nature. 
Incidentally, it should be noted that this structure problem, as I 
describe it, is closely akin to a criticism that has become common among 
pragmatists, literary critics, many continental philosophers, and others con­
cerned with problems of "interpretation." To take an example familiar to 
legal readers, Judge Posner has explained that "practical reason," by which 
he seems to mean "the way we in fact understand the world," does not par­
ticipate directly in reality, but rather accumulates observations (themselves 
questionable) and draws conclusions from them that are not provable. 
Noting that "[t]he brain imposes structure on our perceptions, so that, for 
example, we ascribe causal significance to acts without being able to 
observe ... causality," he explains that "intuition is the body of our bedrock 
beliefs: the beliefs that lie so deep that we do not know how to question 
them; the propositions that we cannot help believing and that therefore 
. f . 1126l hsupp y t e premises or reasoning. 
Judge Posner apparently feels that this observational superstructure is 
not capable of arriving at objectivity and suggests that whatever objectivity 
there may seem to be in the world is an illusion. "[P]olitical consensus," he 
writes, "[is] but a polite name for the will of the stronger," and therefore 
"there is something odd about using political agreement to ground episte­
mological confidence."27 With regard to law, he points out that because 
"[r]ules make dichotomous cuts in continuous phenomena," a rule "sup­
presses potentially relevant circumstances of the dispute."28 In other words, 
whatever formal objectivity legal rules may have rests on a mismatch 
between our ability to make rules-that is, our ability to describe classes of 
events and to say what is redundant about them-and the phenomena they 
attempt to constrain. 
25. Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Funda­
mentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 33 (1993). 
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1990). 
27. Id. at 126. 
28. Id. at 44-46. By "continuous," I take Posner to be drawing a quantitative analogy. In 
statistics, a basic distinction is made between "discrete" random variables-that is, those phenom­
ena that could be counted in units-and "continuous" random variables-those that cannot 
be counted because the "units" are infinitely small. See MOSTELLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 251. 
Thus, Posner means that the "facts" before a judge or legislator are infinitely "small" or complex, 
but the best we can come up with intellectually is a set of rules that would be better suited to 
dealing with discrete random variables. 
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Similarly, Stanley Fish has explained at great length that our ability to 
interpret and understand the world is seriously undermined by the means 
we use to go about it. 29 Fish has noted that we do not "interpret" by way of 
unfiltered observations of reality and rational conclusions drawn from those 
observations.Jo Rather, by our membership in "interpretive communities," 
we take part in a fully mediated experience, and the various intellectual 
devices that do the mediating put the reliability of our observations in 
doubt. Fish defines interpretive community very carefully: 
[le is] not so much a group of individuals who share[] a point of view, 
but a point of view or way of organizing experience that share[s] 
individuals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of 
understanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance [are] the 
content of the consciousness of community members who [are] 
therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they [are] embedded in 
the community's enterprise, community property.Ji 
The practical and political consequences of being so "shared" by an 
interpretive community are, from the nonagnostic perspective, bleak. 
There is no such thing as "reason," at least not as an overarching adjudica­
tor of competing propositions. The primacy of reason necessarily assumes 
an opposition between reason and belief because, if rationality itself is 
merely another belief, it would rest on a basis no firmer and no less subject 
co dispute than the beliefs upon which it purports to rule. According to 
Fish, the assumption is provided for us by our various interpretive commu­
nities, and all such assumptions are contestable.J2 
The fundamental point drawn by Posner, Fish, and many others, then, 
is chat an assumption of objectivity or reliability surrounds the conclusions 
we draw from our observations, but that such an assumption is dubious. 
First, our conclusions are driven by a particular set of organizational devices 
that are not in fact objective or "true," but are privileged above others that 
are no less deserving. Further, our very ability to identify "facts" is dubious 
because we identify them according to questionable techniques and ante­
rior assumptions. I have adopted the "structure" terminology here because 
it avoids difficult technical points and, to me, makes clear how broadly 
29. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE ATEXT IN THIS CLASS? 338-55 (1980). 
30. See id. 
31. STANLEY FISH, DOINO WHAT COMES NATURALLY 141 (1989). On the hazards of 
misinterpreting Fish's terms of art-and most importantly the term "interpretive community"­
see Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 57 (1993). 
32. See Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 998. 
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these problems of observation and theoretical reasoning cut in law and 
elsewhere.33 
B. Planting the Forest 
Thus, the agnostic arrives at a point of some difficulty. Once he has 
cleared Judge Posner's underbrush without knowing where to go from there, 
the situation is one of nihilism as described in Part I.A. It seems that it is 
planting the forest that has led to the whole series of philosophical posi­
tions that I class under the general rubric "agnostic" or "doubtful." These 
views may differ greatly in their details and prescriptions, but I think they 
really differ only in degree with respect to their underlying doubtful claims. 
It is my sense that the surface differences are not terribly important; they 
are primarily the residue of the agnostic philosopher's attempt to rationalize 
away these various problems of nihilism. 
An example that helps to make this apparent is the rejection by criti­
cal race theory (CRT) of many of the basic conclusions of its intellectual 
forebear, CLS. CLS generally took a stridently doubtful tack, leaving some 
with the impression ~hat, according to CLS, "there are no right answers."34 
This was quite problematic for CRT scholars (and for many CLS adherents 
as well) 35 because it left them with nothing on which to base. arguments for 
the social reform central to their project. 
In particular, CLS rejected the liberal democratic ideal that individu­
als have "rights" and that these rights are given substantive content by lib­
eral political philosophy. On the contrary, says CLS, the "liberal rights 
discourse" in fact simply constructs individuals and their own conceptions 
33. Note that this "structure" problem could probably also be cabined in the more familiar 
terms of the conceptualist-realist debate over universals. The agnostic, doubting his ability to 
identify or make use of universals, shuns attempts-such as "theory"-to do so. Within this 
debate the agnostic takes a position akin to nominalism. As I explain the problem, the agnostic 
doubts even the usefulness or existence of"facts"-that is, he questions not only the availability of 
universals but also of "particulars." For a good explanation of the debate and the nominalist view, 
see RORTY, supra note 12, at 17-32. 
I avoid the language of that debate, however, for two reasons. First, it is metaphysical in 
nature, and because metaphysics is simply irrelevant to this Essay it will be well to avoid the 
numerous tedious {and unimportant) problems that come with it. Second, the debate entails a 
fair amount of technical terminology, and I think the "theory" language adopted above helps to 
make the importance of this view for law and legal scholarship more transparent. 
34. DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 427-28. 
35. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; see also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 661-62 (1983) (claiming that, in the end, 
CLS can provide a "constructive program"). 
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of what they deserve.36 In this way the state can merely observe the formal­
ity of protecting rights, thus maintaining an appearance of fairness, and 
thereby preserve its power while perpetrating harms against individuals 
within it. Therefore, to fight for "rights" within the liberal political struc­
ture, even if one wins short-term victories, is ultimately to legitimate an 
inherently imbalanced and unequal regime.37 
Unfortunately, this critique left CRT scholars with no normative basis 
on which to advocate minority interests or oppose oppression. CLS, 
because of its doubtful claim, could not provide a coherent criticism of 
racial oppression; in the end, "the very terms used to proclaim victory 
contain[ed] within them the seeds of defeat."38 Thus, the problem for criti­
cal race theorists was to find some way to accept the CLS critique of rights 
and yet still argue that the "rights" of minorities should be advanced-that 
is, to find some normative basis for their philosophy. 
Numerous CRT scholars have attempted to find this basis, and the 
results have been decidedly nonagnostic. For example, Mari Matsuda finds 
it in the case of Japanese internment camp victims.39 The fact that the 
prisoners at once believed that their government had wronged them and yet 
maintained faith in their rights under the Constitution is evidence, she 
says, that we can both doubt prevailing political discourse and yet believe in 
transcendent values of humanity that require equality and an end to oppres­
sion. Thus, the experience of the powerless can inform our normativity and 
can do so, says Matsuda, in a way that is not subject to doubtful critique. 
Similarly, Anthony Cook looks for a "reconstitutive vision" in the ethical 
teachings of Martin Luther King.40 He writes that King's "Critical Theol­
ogy," by way of its definition of individuals as entities that strive for justice 
(even if they cannot totally succeed), provides a normative foundation for 
arguments against oppression.41 The individual, he writes, is always in the 
36. See Pierre J. Schlag, Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-6 
(1997) (describing the process by which "constitutional mythology" constructs our notion of our 
own rights). 
37. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 6, at xx-xxv; Kimberle Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Refarm, and Retrenchment: Transfarmation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination 
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334, 1356-66 (1988). 
38. Crenshaw, supra note 37, at 1347. 
39. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 338-42 (1987). 
40. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) [hereinafter, Cook, Beyond Critical Legal 
Studies); see also Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resur­
recting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1431 (1994) (arguing for 
"a revitalization of an explicitly normative discourse about the common good"). 
41. See Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies, supra note 40, at 986-88. 
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process of "becoming"; our "essential nature" lies in the struggle for "jus­
tice."42 Thus, the doubter's frustrating claim that we cannot succeed is 
apparently overcome because it is still worthwhile to try. In this way, the 
difficult implications of doubt-in this case, that systematic solutions to the 
problem of racial oppression will not be forthcoming-have led CRT schol­
ars to grope about for answers or explanations, rather than accept the 
awkward possibility that overarching answers and explanations do not exist. 
The latter possibility seems to them like a failure. 
Thus, even though they may not so claim explicitly, doubtful legal 
philosophers often seem still possessed of the hope of finding a systematic 
normativity. That is, even while various writers admit that there is no 
"truth" or that humans have no access to it, they still seek to construct solu­
tions to public problems of administration and private problems of morality 
and personal choices. 
This is so even of many adherents to CLS and postmodernism. For 
example, J.M. Balkin claims that deconstruction does not lead to moral 
relativity because it is merely a process by which we assess the inadequacy of 
human conventions-not the values underlying them. In a move not unlike 
that of Anthony Cook, Balkin writes that values can exist-transcendental 
values-that remain forever inchoate (that is, we may never reach them 
through our various conventions, but we serve them in striving for them).43 
Similarly, Stephen Feldman argues that postmodernism does not.reject "jus­
tice" even though justice may be socially constructed. Justice does not lose 
its usefulness by way of construction because our entire existence-our 
"being-in-the-world," borrowing from Heidegger-is constructed. There­
fore, things that are constructed are still ontologically real, in a way.44 Even 
Pierre Schlag has let slip that if we examine mainstream scholarship in the 
proper critical manner, "we might [arrive at] an understanding of what 'law' 
is and how 'law' maintains itself,"45 suggesting, perhaps, that there is a light 
at the end of the doubtful tunnel. 
Even radical pragmatists, who probably go furthest in examining the 
practical implications of doubt, have sought guiding principles or wisdom to 
aid in navigating life and policy. Richard Rorty, for example, takes an 
extremely doubtful view. He argues that doubt leads ultimately to a rejec­
42. Id. at 1028-30. 
43. See J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
1131, 1176-83 ( 1994 ); id. at 1139 (stating that "transcendent values," including justice, arise from 
"the wellsprings of the human soul," which transcend "the creations of culture"). 
44. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
166, 197-201 (1996). 
45. Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 423 (1992). 
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tion of traditional philosophical approaches altogether; as he put it, he has 
no interest in replacing existing theory with his own metaphysics or episte­
mology, but rather "would simply like to change the subject."46 He would 
advocate no systematic claims at all about what exists or what we can 
know.47 Nevertheless, realizing that his pragmatism is basically quite banal 
in that it cannot serve as a guide in actual decision making,48 Rorty still 
imagines that normative substance will be derived from the "romantic" and 
"visionary" writings of poets and philosophers, which ·justify judicial "leaps 
in the dark," even when they "roil ... the political waters."49 Rorty says 
"visionary" advice is gotten, for example, from "Dewey the prophet rather 
than Dewey the pragmatist philosopher."50 Rorty, though, must still admit 
that "equally romantic and visionary, yet morally appalling, decisions may 
be made by pragmatist judges." His only response is to say that "I do not 
believe that legal theory offers us a defense against such judges-that 
it can do much to prevent another Dred Scott decision."51 His approach, 
then, is ultimately banal-while he hopes to find some normative sub­
stance, it seems that under his commitments that substance can only ever 
be an illusion.52 
Similarly, Judge Posner, who in recent years has taken on the fairly 
extreme pragmatism described above,53 has attempted to define a "pragmatic 
46. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xiv (1982); cf. RORTY, supra 
note 4, at 189-98 (arguing that there are no "essences" or principles underlying life). For a sum­
mary introduction to Rorty's work, see Moore, supra note 9, at 892-905 and Singer, supra note 10. 
47. See RORTY, supra note 46, at 165. 
48. See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1811, 1811 (1990). 
49. Id. at 1817-19. 
50. Id. at 1815. 
51. Id. at 1818. 
52. See also Grey, supra note 4 (finding similar normative substance in the poetry of 
Wallace Stevens). Rorty suggests elsewhere that pragmatism is normatively positive because it 
necessarily leads to greater tolerance (a value that is left to the reader to agree is good). Rorty 
writes that, "[i]n the end, the pragmatists tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings 
clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right." RORTY, supra note 46, at 
166. On a strictly personal level, I am partial to that sentiment, I suppose, but, as Stanley Fish 
points out, Rorty's tolerance value is reached only through a decidedly nonpragmatic methodol­
ogy. Such a methodology is at odds with Rorty's premises because it depends on rationalized, 
pre-determined values (tolerance) and skills or methods (the practice of tolerance) that precede 
real-life situations. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1447, 1465-67 (1990). Furthermore, Rorty assumes that there can be a privileged 
value-tolerance-which may strike one as compelling or desirable, but which is nevertheless 
indefensible in the face of criticisms Rorty himself puts forward. This tolerance value, then, also 
fails to rescue Rorty from his apparent fear that nihilism is an unacceptable endpoint. 
53. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. For a quick overview of Judge Posner's 
current position, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 29 (1995) (advocating "living 
without foundations"); POSNER, supra note 26, at 454-69 (setting out a "Pragmatist Manifesto" 
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theory of adjudication."54 Under this program, "'a pragmatist judge always 
tries to do the best he can do for the present and the future, unchecked 
by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials 
have done in the past."'55 Thus, primary concern is focused on the facts 
of individual cases and reliance on positive law is required only insofar 
as the values of uniformity and predictability outweigh other values. The ulti­
mate goal is simply "reasonableness." This is defensible, he says, because 
the pragmatic judge is only seeking to "produc[e] the best results for the 
future."56 Thus, Judge Posner's ideal model of judging is "for judges to con­
ceive of their task, in every case, as that of striving to reach the most 
reasonable result in the circumstances ... substituting the humble, fact­
bound, policy-soaked, instrumental concept of 'reasonableness' for both 
legal and moral rightness."57 It is not particularly difficult to see the 
problems with that "theory," however,58 and they are particularly ironic, 
given much of Judge Posner's earlier work.59 My point here, of course, is not 
predicated on the beliefs that "there is no such thing as 'legal reasoning,"' that there "are no 
moral 'reals,"' and that hard cases cannot be decided objectively if "objectivity" is different than 
"reasonableness"). 
54. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 24-33; Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 
CAROOZO L. REV. l (1996). 
55. Posner, supra note 54, at 4. 
56. Id. at 4; see also id. at 7-8. 
57. POSNER, supra note 26, at 130. For reasons that are difficult to encapsulate in a short 
note, Judge Posner suggests that this pragmatic jurisprudence could be constrained to an extent 
by-alas-microeconomics. See id. at 387-92. However, I think Judge Posner has a difficult task 
to show why economic "rules" are any more determinate than the legal "rules" he so powerfully 
criticizes, especially given his own observation that "economic theory has become so rich, so 
complex, that almost any hypothesis, even one that appeared to deny a fundamental implication 
of the theory such as the law of demand, could be made to conform to the theory." Id. at 363-64 
(noting the example of the "Giffen good," which becomes more desirable as its price increases). 
Furthermore, as Fish explains, there is a seriously problematic irony in setting out powerful 
agnostic criticisms of the sort Posner adopts and then trying to rehabilitate oneself through an 
essentialist crutch like economics. See Fish, supra note 52, at 1460-62. 
58. Indeed, Judge Posner sets out even those limited guidelines to allay criticisms that his 
approach "endorses a visceral, personalized, rule-less, free-wheeling, unstructured conception of 
judging." Posner, supra note 54, at 3. This was his response specifically to the remarks of Jeffrey 
Rosen. See Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 581, 584-96 (1995). 
59. The irony is that Posner's theory falls prey to the same problems that caused him so 
roundly to reject utilitarianism-a predecessor of law and economics-earlier in his career. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). In The Economics of]ustice, he dis· 
misses utilitarianism as "spongy and' nonoperative" because it was beset by problems of indetermi· 
nacy, and because it was so manipulable that it could easily legitimate "moraLmonsters," like mass 
murder, so long as they could be said to maximize aggregate happiness. See id. at 51-58. But 
"pragmatic adjudication" is similarly a spongy nonphilosophy that is sufficiently manipulable 
to justify essentially any judicial decision. As Jeffrey Rosen writes, pragmatic adjudication "is 
nothing more than a license for judges to ventilate their personal instincts." Rosen, supra note 58, 
at 589. 
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to vilify Judge Posner; it is merely that even legal thinkers willing to sacri­
fice belief in anything tend to find themselves groping for philosophical 
answers to the problems of doubt, and Judge Posner's is yet another case in 
which it seems that the solution is simply no solution.60 
These various attempts to overcome the apparently intractable prob­
lems of doubt suggest that, maybe, nihilism is just a natural consequence of 
our limitations as humans. We simply cannot seem to overcome doubt by 
way of principled arguments or theories, unless you define principles in such 
a relative or nonsystematic way that you have begged the question whether 
they exist. Naturally, we want very much to describe right and wrong, good 
and bad, and, for that matter, everything else in ways that will be useful to 
us as people and policymakers. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that 
there simply is no means to repair the damage done by doubt. Thus, it 
seems that even the most doubtful of agnostics typically hide from the 
awkward possibility of nihilism: we simply cannot evaluate our choices or 
our environment in any meaningful way. But if we begin to think like that, 
the fear sets in that we face a basically aphilosophical and pragmatic 
existence. This fear-and the arguments that arise from it-are the subject 
of the remainder of this Essay. 
II. FACING DOUBT ON THE MERITS 
Numerous attempts exist by mainstream philosophers to show that we 
can in fact know things-that is, to confront doubt as an epistemic position 
and, in some cases, to provide a compelling alternative. As lawyers are a 
fairly pragmatic lot, it is only natural that in legal scholarship it has been 
more common to oppose doubt according to the reductio claim, which will 
be discussed in Part Ill. Nevertheless, other arguments have been raised, 
and some authors have even set out arguments purporting to show how we 
60. This criticism-that even doubters tend to argue for policy and moral solutions that are 
at odds with doubt-was apparently first raised in legal thought by Roscoe Pound in response 
to legal realism. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
697 (1931). 
Incidentally, there are those scholars who seem to accept nihilism and remain untroubled. 
For example, Sanford Levinson writes that his work-which he calls "metatheory," or scholarship 
that is about "first-order" theory written from a "second-order" perspective-will never propose 
solutions or advice for resolution of real disputes or formulation of real policy. See Sanford 
Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the 
Things I Do?). 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 398-403 (1992). That is simply not an interesting role 
for the law professor in Levinson's world. The problem, however, is that one is still left asking 
"now what?'' Levinson's approach may be "right," insofar as it may prove interesting and useful, 
but he does not (and could not) argue that the question of how we should act goes away simply 
because he doesn't care about it. 
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can know things. Clearly such a mechanism is necessary to certain legal 
philosophies-natural law, for instance-when otherwise severe problems 
of epistemology would render the entire scheme useless. This Part faces the 
most important general arguments and explains why they really pose no 
solution to the agnostic's simple observation that we don't seem to know 
how to know things. 
A. No Need for Absolutes 
The agnostic's sometimes frustrating emphasis on the impossibility of 
absolutes has led to a common and quite thoughtful argument. Its pro­
ponent will generally concede the basic agnostic observation, but then 
complain that the agnostic asks too much of the world by demanding 
absolutes and then proclaiming, when he shows that there are none, that 
agnosticism must be right.61 Indeed the nonagnostic is right to say that just 
because some value or idea is not absolute does not mean it is therefore any 
less real. The nonagnostic will thus argue that even if we can't know things, 
we can still make use of beliefs or whatever, and that the agnostic should 
therefore be willing to compromise.62 
There is undoubtedly something to this argument. Clearly, it is a good 
picture of how we in fact live-no one goes about their daily business trying 
to doubt everything, for it would be both impossible and ridiculous.63 With 
a little thought, however, it is apparent how important a critique doubt is 
when aimed at intellectual projects. I for one think that its significance for 
academia, and especially the social sciences, simply cannot be overstated. 
The nonagnostic in this instance is essentially saying that the doubtful 
observation is a banal one. This argument thus raises the question of 
whether there is any point in writing papers such as the present one, and, 
indeed, whether there is any point in pursuing the agnostic view. 
Intellectual projects by their nature always, at least implicitly, contain 
certain claims of first philosophy. Academic projects, in particular, usually 
contain strong ones. For example, when a law professor writes a paper 
arguing for a particular policy outcome, he will implicitly claim that there is 
some degree of ontological reality to "good" and "bad," that theory is reli­
61. Not everyone, incidentally, thinks the argument is so thoughtful. See PIERRE J. 
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (forthcoming 1998) (arguing that the requirement 
of absolutes does not arise from the agnostic, but rather from the need of the nonagnostic to dis· 
tinguish objective ways of knowing from mere faith or prejudice). 
62. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 8, at 842; see also Singer, supra note 10, at 59 (quoting 
Hans Meyerhoff for the proposition that "we should reject the idea that '[e)ither philosophy is the 
Truth (with a capital T) or it is nothing-(or it is 'Sophistry')"'). 
63. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
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able, that there are identifiable values, and that it is within his power to 
identify and evaluate them. Indeed, any argument assumes that there are 
values of which we can make use, because implicit in the argument is the 
claim that it would be better for the reader to agree than tc;> disagree. In 
other words, a scholarly project necessarily contains a range of more or less 
implicit metaphysical claims. However, agnosticism is an epistemic issue 
that is necessarily anterior to and undercuts all metaphysics-it is the ques­
tion whether or not we have the capacity to verify any of our metaphysical 
conclusions. 
Still, one might not think that that problem in itself is so important. 
The nonagnostic might take a position like this: We could define a new 
word "know*" to mean that we know* a proposition when affirming it is "a 
useful compromise with our circumstances" or is part of a "view of our situa­
tion that at present makes the most sense of our experience," or language to 
that effect. In other words, one could simply make a new word that lowers 
the threshold criteria for the reliability of our observations. The non­
agnostic might claim that for practical purposes "know" and "know*" are 
precisely the same thing, and that if one quietly replaced "know" with 
"know*" in every circumstance in which we use that term, it would in fact 
have no effect on how we live our lives. Therefore, one might say that the 
agnostic's point that we can't "know" should have no effect on scholarship 
or law.61 
My response is two-fold. First, the distinction between "know" and 
"know*" matters significantly in the following very concrete sense. If a per­
son admits that the best we can do is "know*," then he admits that every 
truth claim "X" must actually, implicitly mean "I think X, even though I 
can't prove it." If he then engages in ongoing debate with other people in 
which he says "I think X, even though I can't prove it," and another person 
responds "Well, I think Y, even though I can't prove it," and another says, 
"Well, I think Z, even though I can't prove it," then what you have is 
not so much a search for "truth" or right answers or anything of that sort, 
but rather a slightly bizarre forum containing nothing but each person's 
report on his own inner status. 
The basic agnostic criticism of this situation, therefore, is that by 
engaging in debate at all, the parties have begged what seems like a pretty 
important anterior question: whether there is any value to the claim, "I 
think X, even though I can't prove it." That is, if a person can say only 
64. See E-mail from Daniel A. Farber, Professor, University of Minnesota, to Christopher 
L. Sagers, Attorney, Arnold & Porter (June 30, 1998) (on file with author) (setting out the argu­
ment presented in the text). 
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what he thinks, is there any reason to pay attention? What if another per­
son thinks exactly the opposite? Who's right? Do either of them gain by 
reporting to each other the dissonance between their instincts? Which one 
deserves to have the world accept his report on the status of his inner feel­
ings? This is the reason that legal discourse or debate generally so fills the 
agnostic with ennui and, incidentally, also explains why legal scholarship is 
so easy for the world to disregard. 
The second reason to believe doubt matters is more esoteric but more 
moving (in my mind). Both the plausibility and apparent significance of 
doubt depend a lot on the altitude from which one views the world. When 
we operate in the everyday mode-when we see the world from sea level, as 
it were-in which we are concerned with the bills we have to pay, the reply 
brief that was just served on a client, or what to have for lun~h, agnosticism 
looks pretty silly. We each operate on useful beliefs (for example, we 
know* that the sun will come up tomorrow, we know* right from wrong), 
and we get along just fine without questioning ourselves. 
But, on the other hand, if you step back a little and consider how 
much we know (or even know*) about ourselves and the world around us­
as Nietzsche might say, when you look at the world from the top of a 
mountain-you might make a few observations like this: ( 1) humans appear 
to be here by accident; (2) our morals and our beliefs and our knowledge* 
might just be evolutionary tricks, like our epiglottis, which keeps us from 
choking to death; and, most importantly, (3) we exist in a universe that is 
perhaps infinitely vast, that might go on for billions or trillions of years after 
we are extinct, and that was here billions of years before our earliest 
ancestral chain of RNA had even formed in the water. For what it is worth, 
we appear to be a momentary flash in the pan.65 
When you consider human insignificance on this scale, you not only 
gain humility and circumspection, you also begin to wonder about things 
like whether there is any point to people bitterly disputing, say, the parol 
evidence rule. That is, our relative insignificance and our apparently acci­
dental nature, coupled with our epistemic inability, throw all of our values 
and beliefs into doubt. It suddenly seems much less compelling that we 
cannot dispose of our everyday beliefs.66 Thus, from this perspective, it 
65. Levi-Strauss expressed this sentiment more simply but most powerfully when he said 
that "[t)he world began without man and will end without him." CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, 
TRISTES TROPIQUES 413 (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., Penguin Books 
1992) (1955 ). 
66. See infra Part Ill and accompanying text. As I explain below, I think that inability is a 
major reason that doubt is so difficult for many people to accept. 
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makes a lot more sense to give doubt the time of day, and to be suspicious of 
claims like, "I think X, even though I can't prove it." 
A distinction might be made here with which I would not disagree. 
As Rorty explains, a person can make "edifying," as opposed to "con­
structive" scholarship.67 The former seeks only to convey something of the 
writer, to explain what the writer is thinking about. "Constructive" work, 
by contrast, seeks at a minimum to provide guidance of a more or less con­
crete nature-Le., to show that some particular avenue is more desirable 
than another.68 
The problem, then, is that constructive scholarship cannot possibly 
proceed without problematic underlying assumptions. That is, constructive 
scholarship depends on the usefulness and availability of at least some 
absolutes. This dependency is problematic because it requires the scholar 
sooner or later to face nihilism. Edifying scholarship doesn't necessarily 
share this problem-like poets or painters, edifying scholars don't need to 
worry about problematic ex ante assumptions because they have no concern 
with absolutes.69 
However, we are still by our nature left with a sense that constructive 
scholarship is something we should be able to do, and that it is needed. And, 
currently at least, edifying scholarship is not of much use to law schools. 
We are still quite preoccupied with figuring out what courts and legislatures 
should do. Therefore, I think that the concern for absolutes is much more 
than just banal or unduly picky; their absence, I think impugns basically all 
of our intellectual projects. 
B. Transcendental Arguments 
A very old criticism of doubt is one sometimes known as the "tran­
scendental paradox" or "principle of noncontradiction." The claim is that 
one cannot make an argument that contradicts itself. The agnostic claim 
may seem to violate this rule because if one says, "There is no objective 
truth," the doubter has oxymoronically made a claim about something that 
he thinks is true. In other words, it is said that there must be some tran­
scendental truth underlying the claim because any claim about the world 
necessarily contains a claim that at least one thing is true. Aristotle first 
67. See RORTY, supra note 12, at 357-60 & n.4. 
68. See id. 
69. It is not entirely clearly how this sort of scholarship would work, but, at a minimum, 
the edifying scholar must be prepared to live with internal self-contradiction. That is, the scholar 
must appreciate that humans can't do anything without beliefs and a deep, quiet metaphysics­
facts that are at odds with the agnostic critique. I have done my best to accommodate that 
appreciation in this very Essay. 
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raised this argument.70 The noncontradiction argument has turned up in 
numerous places elsewhere.71 
I think this argument in its various forms is incorrect as applied to 
agnosticism, as opposed to skepticism as I define the term, and therefore not 
really relevant to my main claim. Because agnosticism is only an epistemic 
claim,72 I say nothing about truth, only about our access to it if in fact it 
exists. Furthermore, the claim is not bound up with the metaphysical issue 
of its own truth, for as I have already noted, it does not matter if agnosti, 
cism is not "true."73 Thus, agnosticism states neither element necessary to 
the noncontradiction argument-the claim that nothing is true, on the one 
hand, or that agnosticism is true, on the other. The noncontradiction cri, 
tique, therefore, is actually aimed at a claim I do not make-a claim about 
truth. 
At this point this argument probably seems a little sophistical. After 
all, my whole view rests on a claim that I will make no attempt to prove­
as if I am saying th(lt agnosticism is right and also possibly wrong. But on 
the contrary, not only is this argument not just a trick; I think it uncovers 
one of the most important insights of the doubtful view. It is the very 
nature of the agnostic enterprise to proceed in life and decision making 
without deciding questions of truth and falsity. 
It will be useful, I think, to examine precisely what it means to say 
"agnosticism is right and also possibly wrong." The words right and wrong in 
that sentence do not refer to two poles on the same continuum, but rather 
reflect quite different properties. To be "right" means that agnosticism is a 
useful compromise with our circumstances-in fact it is a sort of default 
position, a view of our situation that at present makes sense of our experi, 
ence. Therefore, "right" in this sense means only that agnosticism is a 
passive, circumspect admission of epistemic limits, which has no regard for 
whether there are better epistemic approaches on the horizon. It does not 
mean that agnosticism is an active truth claim or an ontological "real." 
"Wrong," by contrast, is a statement of ontological certainty-that is, a 
claim that there is an objective truth about our capacity for perception that 
is true whether we can prove it yet or not. Obviously, to deny this latter 
claim-to say that agnosticism cannot be wrong-would be directly at odds 
with the basic claim of agnosticism, and thus would violate the principle of 
70. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. f, ch. 4, at 59-64 (Hippocrates G. Apostle 
trans., 1979). 
71. See A.C. Grayling, Epistemology, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
53-58 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui· James eds., 1996) (summarizing various approaches). 
72. See supra note 3. 
73. See supra note 3. 
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noncontradiction just as its proponent argues. However, as I have said, the 
agnostic does not make such a claim. This is so for the same reason that the 
agnostic is not an atheist-for to dispute a claim is the same mistake as to 
accept it. 
The noncontradiction argument is a perceptive critique when it is 
aimed at the proper target. I think it effectively undermines skepticism or 
ontological antirealism, at least so long as the skeptic or antirealist has no 
explanation for her inability to avoid self-contradiction. Because I make no 
ontological claims whatsoever, however, the argument just misses the mark. 
C. Michael Moore, His Ilk, and the Theology of the Right Answer 
While some legal scholars have set forth metaphysically real models of 
morals or views of law implying some metaphysical reality, surprisingly few 
of them have focused with any care on the epistemic issues thereby raised. 
Surprising, I say, because in my view such a focus is necessary for them. 
One could hardly ground a philosophy on the belief that there are real 
answers to our problems without also believing that we have the. epistemic 
firepower to find them. Metaphysical claims of this . nature are fairly 
implied, if not made explicitly, in all natural-law scholarship, by its very 
nature, in any sort of formalistic positivism that anticipates right 
applications of rules, and elsewhere. I consider these various philosophies 
to contain radically unresolved problems of epistemology, even conceding 
arguendo their metaphysical commitments. 
Michael Moore, for example, is a self-styled metaphysical realist and 
has written at length about the existence and usefulness of "moral reals."74 
While he has set out warehouse categorizations of the various doubtful posi­
tions and what he perceives to be their problems,75 he has really only raised 
the handful of arguments I deal with here-the reductio,76 a transcendental 
argument,77 and so on. One of Moore's most curious and unfulfilling argu­
ments-and one common of realist writing-is his simple, table-thumping 
insistence that we do actually have access to real. morals. He claims that 
agnosticism is "inconsistent with our daily experience [because w]e often 
seem to be giving reasons justifying our moral judgments. Indeed, a moral 
judgment seems to carry with it the expectation that there are good reasons 
74. See Moore, supra note 9; Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 
S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Moore, supra note 18. 
75. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9; Moore, supra note 18. 
76. See Moore, supra note 74, at 310 (stating that doubters are subject to a "conceptual 
schizophrenia"-they are unable to adhere to their doubts when simply living their private lives). 
For my arguments regarding the reductio, see infra Part III. 
77. See Moore, supra note 74, at310-l l. 
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sufficient to justify it."78 I hardly even feel a need to respond because I can 
merely point out that (1) to me it does not seem that way, and ( 2) the fact 
that it seems that way to Moore just does not prove anything. 
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin has set forth what is in essence a natural­
law model, or perhaps a legal positivism composed of really compelling and 
identifiable rules, but he does not directly face epistemic issues.79 He quite 
notoriously sets out his technique for finding "right" answers-which he 
apparently assumes to have some degree of ontological reality-without 
direct consideration either of the metaphysical issues thereby raised or, 
more problematically, the epistemic ones.80 Thus, whether or not there is 
such a thing as "rightness," it remains unclear how we logically prove such a 
thing. Dworkin's more recent model of interpretation-that is, of finding 
the law81-is elegant and compelling in its own right, but it still begs epis­
temic issues. 
III. THE ILLOGIC OF THE REDUCTIO 
As I mentioned, it has been much more common for legal academics 
to face doubt through the very practical reductio than by way of careful 
analytical argument. That is, it has been easier to say that doubtful views 
lead to awkward or seemingly impossible outcomes, and therefore must be 
untrue. This is natural, I think; when one arrives at the point described in 
Part I-the sense that there is no means by which to guide life or policy 
through philosophy-the awkward problems of nihilism are exposed in 
sharp detail. The natural reaction is to search for some means to overcome 
our predicament. Thus, there has been a great tendency amongst nonag­
nostics to view nihilism as the very reason that doubt must' be "wrong." 
As I note in the Introduction, I think it is important to deal with these 
problems separately from the arguments faced in the last part because I 
think it is these very visceral reactions that explain .the general dislike for 
doubt, rather than any reasoned philosophy, and because they are much 
more powerful than the latter. Furthermore, I think it is often these reac­
tions that actually drive the more sophisticated arguments discussed in Part 
II-that is, various scholars have constructed arguments not for the 
arguments' own sake, but in order to give reputable vent to their intuitive, 
reductio-based feelings. 
78. Moore, supra note 18, at 1072-73. 
79. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
80. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
81. See DWORKIN, supra note 79, at 45-86. 
488 46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 461 (1998) 
As an example of a typical reductio, agnostic philosophies are often 
said to be immoral.82 Whenever a person publicly espouses agnostic views, 
some eavesdropping metaphysical realist or a person otherwise nondoubtful 
about something will invariably come over and say, "Oh yeah, well .what 
about the Nazis? Don't you believe they were bad?" or "Isn't it obvious that 
murder is bad?" or the like.83 That is, someone will pose the predictable 
devils of moral relativism and solipsism-or, put more generally, nihilism. 
The realist smiles knowingly, for the squirming agnostic is now in a seem­
ingly impossible trap. The agnostic fumbles and hesitates because, in order 
to maintain the integrity of his agnostic views, he seemingly must admit 
that the Nazis may not have been bad, or whatever. Thus, both the agnos­
tic and the realist know that the reductio of rigorous agnosticism is utter 
subjectivity. Similar reductio arguments can be raised on grounds other 
than the immorality of doubt-for example, that doubt must be faulty 
because it leads us to the conclusion that physics is hopelessly subjective. 
The realist goes on to argue that because doubt has brought us to nihilism, 
the agnostic has failed. 
The first and, to me, the most obvious response is that the argument is 
simply a non sequitur. Doubt may lead to nihilism, it is true; but so what if 
it does? After all, even if nihilism is "bad" (which is not obvious), what if it 
is inescapable? If agnosticism is a proper or even only an as-yet insur­
mountable epistemic view, then nihilism is the human condition, and 
should be faced for what it is rather than hidden from by means of clever 
arguments or constructions. 
Furthermore, the reductio claim, if you think about it, begs a deep, sub­
tle, and especially interesting question. The nonagnostic seems to hold that 
there should be some correlation between our visceral reactions to events 
and the world around us. This, too, is a non sequitur. The problem I think, 
is that our perceptions of the world are complex and unsystematic. If our 
82. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 422-23; Joel F. Handler, Postmodemism, Protest, 
and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 697 (1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism 
About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994); Patterson, supra 
note 9, at 20-21. 
83. 	 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 79, at 84-85. 
[The agnostic) cannot reserve his skepticism for some quiet philosophical moment, and 
press his own opinions about the morality of slavery, for example, ... when he is off duty 
and only acting in the ordinary way. He has given up his distinction between ordinary 
and objective opinions; if he really believes ... that no moral judgment is really better 
than any other, he cannot then add that in his opinion slavery is unjust. 
Id.; Moore, supra note 74, at 310 ("[Agnostics suffer from) a kind of conceptual schizophrenia: 
when writing they propound subjectivist epistemology, but when it comes to daily living they 
make judgments and decisions as we all do: presupposing the existence of tables, chairs, and right 
answers to hard moral dilemmas and legal cases."). 
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reactions are nothing more than ad hoc emotions rather than observations 
of ontological reals, then the observation that some things seem "bad" or 
"good" does not mean anything per se. For example, the realist will raise a 
typical reductio, like "Oh, come on, you must believe that slavery is bad." 
The agnostic will admit that that seems right, and may even admit that the 
seeming rightness of the statement is not historically contingent-that is, 
that slavery seems to have been "bad" even at those times when many peo­
ple thought that it was not. The problem is that the realist cannot draw 
any generalizable principle from that visceral sense that some human prac­
tice is "bad." In precise terms, what we mean by our gut-reaction claim that 
"slavery is bad" is not that it is bad-as if the word has some clearly defined 
meaning on which we all agree-but that "I wish it hadn't happened,'' "The 
suffering of the victims was a disgrace,'' "The arrogance of the slave owners 
infuriates me," and so on. We feel a cluster of dimly outlined, nonsystem­
atic emotions about this act. But we cannot identify a core principle or 
principles that explain why slavery is "bad" or that tell us anything about 
what "badness" is. Thus, even if we could arrive at a more rigorous explana­
tion of why slavery is bad, it would not help us to understand when other 
things are bad-it would not lead us to any theoretical explanation of good 
and bad. Moreover, even those seemingly meaningful sensations of right 
and wrong we experience in the face of situations like slavery or nazism are 
present only at extremes. Yes, of course, most of us feel that slavery and 
nazism and so on are bad. But we clearly share no agreement on virtually 
anything but these extremes. Pornography, abortion, welfare, government· 
spending decisions, what to have for dinner, etc.; no uniform consensus 
could possibly be formed on such issues or any of the infinite range of other 
issues that are not "extreme." 84 
Let me emphasize the I do not believe that the seemingly irrefutable 
sensations we experience at these extremes mean that we are privy to some 
transcendental values made manifest at points of extremity. That would 
simply be the reductio restated. And I am certainly not interested in the 
context of this discussion in what should be thought of as bad or not. The 
only matter of significance for my purposes is the epistemic nature of 
these sensations-what is going on beneath the surface and whether the 
mere fact of these sensations proves anything about reality or our ability to 
84. It is worth noting that we do not all agree on even the extremes, suggesting that there 
is no core substance of "badness" in even the most extreme acts, unless we are prepared to say that 
anyone who disagrees with us on these points must themselves be bad or crazy. Some people 
currently experience ambivalence about abortion, for example, while to others the question is 
clear-cut. 
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perceive it. The point for me is that there is no principled substance to our 
visceral reactions to events, at least as far as the reductio can prove. 
The reductio begs another question. The argument seems to be that 
our emotional reactions cannot be inconsistent with our true epistemic 
nature. That is, if a feeling we have about something presupposes a certain 
epistemic ability, then the fact that we have the feeling means that we have 
that ability. Thus, the realist seems to be saying that because the agnostic 
cannot comfortably deny that nazism was wrong, that inability betrays the 
agnostic's own inner commitment to a sort of epistemic power that provides 
useful answers. But what if we simply cannot make ourselves conform to our 
own epistemic nature? Is it impossible that our willingness to believe in 
things is simply the result of our complex and contradictory nature? 
In my view, our inability to deny every proposition-a task that the 
reductio always demands of the agnostic-is not a failure of doubt as a philo­
sophical commitment, but is simply the result of our limitations as humans. 
In a simple world, the agnostic would believe in nothing and would indulge 
luxuriously in entertaining every possibility. In real life, this luxury always 
seems beyond reach, for even the most diligent agnostic finds it impossible 
to discard every belief. For example, we cannot consistently maintain dis­
belief that, as our feet fall before us, we will continue to meet solid earth, or 
that our friends are who they appear to be, or that if the police catch us 
committing a crime we will regret it, or whatever. Shedding all of our 
beliefs seems just as impossible as conceptualizing infinity, for we operate on 
a daily basis by using a seemingly infinite number of beliefs.85 Therefore, 
the practkal limitations of our human minds demand that we use some 
device to free us from the infinite range of possibility. Our device is belief. 
Furthermore, even the agnostic wants to believe-after all, everyone 
experiences foxhole religion when times are bad. It is simply natural, for 
whatever reason, that we strive for answers and explanations. The fact that 
the human mind is incapable of shedding all its various beliefs, however, 
does not prove either that there are extra-human values or moral rules, just 
out there somewhere, or that we should look for some regularizing principles, 
whether "real," or merely agreed upon. It is foolish to believe that just 
because we cannot conceive of some possibility then it must not be possible. 
For example, in calculus, we learn that we cannot visualize an asymptotic 
function ever reaching its limit-we imagine the asymptotic curve just 
reaching forever nearer the limit (which is in fact the case-"forever" and 
85. This. tracks Hume's observation. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, essay XII, pt. I (P.H. Nidditch ed., 1978) (1748). I think this is also 
what Holmes was getting at with his "can't helps." See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918). 
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"never" are two ways of saying the same thing)-and yet the possibility of 
reaching the limit through infinite iterations is exploited throughout calcu­
lus and physics. 
Finally, note again that the reductio can be raised by the nonagnostic 
with respect to any subject the agnostic can doubt, moral or otherwise. The 
nonagnostic can say, for example, "Oh, come on, your view would mean 
that physics is subjective," or "Agnosticism must mean that Neil Armstrong 
didn't walk on the moon," or whatever. I have used the moral examples in 
the text above only because they are often raised, and they put the issue 
plainly in sight. My view is simply that the reductio, no matter what subject 
is on the table, always fails for the reasons I have explained. It is a non 
sequitur, to begin with, and it begs important epistemic questions. 
IV. DEFANGING DOUBT 
Even doubters seem to fear doubt. It is hard to imagine how we can go 
on without the prospect of at least some knowledge or useful belief at the 
end of the tunnel. This fear quite obviously drives the reductio, and I think 
it also drives the general search by even agnostics for ways to overcome 
doubt. But I think a better approach, once doubt is accepted as a necessary 
consequence of our human limitations, is to absolve nihilism of its negative 
connotation. And here, I think, is what this Essay is fundamentally about: 
Doubt has been rejected not because it is bad, but because it is difficult. 
Therefore, the key to resolving that difficulty does not lie in proving doubt 
wrong. Rather, the key is to recognize that the problem with nihilism is not 
nihilism itself. The problem is a set of anterior assumptions we maintain 
about what we need to be able to accomplish as a species to be successful. 
In particular, we harbor two major misconceptions that, in my opin­
ion, drive our fear of doubt. I think both problems can be dispelled with a 
little effort. First of all, it seems intuitive that the failure of objective 
morality will lead to anarchy and mayhem. Without a moral compass, poli­
tics and personal choices seem hopeless. Second, it seems that if we cannot 
come up with ways to explain the world simply, human progress will halt. 
That is, our technology, our government, our legal system, and so on all 
seem to require that we be able to explain the world about us, or else we 
might as well just fumble around in chaos. I discuss each problem in turn. 
A. The Politics of Doubt 
Perhaps the most perplexing question is whether one can embrace 
agnosticism. and yet know right from wrong or evaluate social conditions, or 
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the like. The agnostic must admit that morality is subjective on her 
account and is thus indeterminate as guidance for real-world behavior. 
Thus, one is left to wonder: Is agnosticism a license to steal or kill or rape? 
The essential agnostic response to this problem must be a practical 
one, and it again capitalizes on the nonagnostic's confusion of epistemology 
with ontology. The basic doubtful claim is about what humans can do as 
thinkers and knowers-it is epistemic. It is unconcerned with what exists 
beyond the human mind. For all the agnostic cares, there may be some set 
. of real morals floating around out in space, but it doesn't matter because we 
simply can't make determinate sense of them. In this way, the agnostic is in 
fact quite humble. Moral questions are left unanswered not because the 
agnostic is a bad person, but because she distrusts her own ability to resolve 
such questions for others. This is again like the difference between agnosti­
cism and atheism. For to claim that murder, for example, is acceptable 
would be an ontological claim about morals-the sort of claim the agnostic 
shuns. Indeed, the claims of realists and other nonagnostics-including 
moral claims about right and wrong behavior-seem by contrast unduly 
arrogant. 
Thus, in the matter of individual morality, we are left to fend for our­
selves. The reductio again arises at this point-if we are constrained by no 
morals, then the world is anarchy. People are free to behave as they choose. 
But, as far as I am concerned, this should not be so troubling. I think moral 
philosophies have been no constraint in any event; in fact they seem to be 
of little real-world significance (in no small measure because academia is 
generally inaccessible to the public). Those who are disposed to act in ways 
harmful to others will do so whether or not we can identify ontologically 
real morals, those who are not so disposed will not. To the extent that 
some of us do not feel individually constrained from acting in ways harmful 
to others, much of that harm is captured in criminal and tort law. 
But then one must wonder: if no act is "bad," then why have criminal 
or tort laws? And, on the other hand, if we have no such law will we not 
live in a world of chaos? The answer, I think, is that we have criminal and 
tort, and other law not because it is right, but because it seems necessary. 
That is, even though we don't know how to make criminal law properly, to 
the extent that this means making a criminal law informed by the proper 
principles, we are still motivated by animal need to control events that 
threaten us. After all, murders and rapes and so on do occur, and they are 
fairly unambiguously "bad" for the victims. Thus, we are and always have 
been motivated by visceral notions of real-world necessity. If we had to 
start from scratch, we would presumably attempt to prevent at least 
"extreme" behavior such as murder and rape and other acts that cause suf­
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fering. Thus, we have developed an incremental, entropic, probably path­
dependent set of constraints on behavior over a very long period of time. 
That in itself, however, does not mean that criminal or tort law reflect any 
principled notion of right and wrong. Certainly, no one could convincingly 
identify an underlying normative scheme in a body of rules like our own 
criminal law, such that the law could be said to reflect a particular con­
ception of morality. 
In response to the fear that criminal, tort, or other law does not cap­
ture some behaviors we find threatening, I turn to a famous paper written 
many years ago by Christopher Alexander. He explained that the world 
simply may work in ways that the human mind cannot robustly explain.86 
Alexander, who was an architect, wrote about the generally poor fit 
between planned cities-that is, cities designed from sci:atch by urban 
planners-and the everyday needs of the people for whom they were built. 
He explained that humans tend to order their perceptions of phenomena 
according to rigid, categorical systems. He thought that these systems did 
not correspond very well to the organization of the external world-which 
was a web of perhaps infinitely complex and haphazard interrelationships­
and that this tension accounted for the inadequacy of planned cities. 
Alexander wrote that organic (as opposed to planned) cities are the 
residue of life. The haphazard scatter of buildings, streets, homes, and busi­
nesses, and so on is the result of people placing things where they need 
them, incrementally, over time. I think that "organic" tort and criminal 
law can similarly be seen as the residue of living, real-world disputes. Like 
planned cities, "planned" legal doctrine-a body of rigid, theoretically con­
sistent decision rules formed in the abstract-would be ill-suited to the 
needs of real-world litigants. The implication for this Essay is that law, like 
urban development, has and will work out passably well, and even when it 
works out in ways that are disappointing to us, it is unlikely that we could 
do better by some ex ante theoretical planning. Thus, while it might be 
good if we could theorize law and legal phenomena, or infuse our criminal 
or tort law with guiding values to produce "right" outcomes, we can't, so we 
should probably not worry about it so much and focus on what we can do. 
Thus, although nihilism may leave us in a state of some anxiety about our 
hope to control threatening events, I suspect that whatever systematic 
attempts we make to protect ourselves, we will be left with substantially 
similar threats. 
86. See Christopher Alexander, A Ciry ls Not a Tree, ARCHITECTURAL FORUM, Apr. 
1965, at 58. 
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It is interesting that those who express the most radical doubts are 
often those who seem most worried by them and most diligently in search of 
humane solutions. Joseph Singer, for example, has written that even 
though "[l]aw and morality have no rational foundation," we should not be 
troubled because "[t]he lack of a rational foundation to legal reasoning does 
not prevent us from developing passionate moral and political commit­
ments."87 Whether or not one accepts the logic by which he reaches this 
conclusion, the important thing is that he goes on to provide a particularly 
thoughtful and compassionate list of tasks that he believes a society must 
perform, notwithstanding the underlying relativity of morals. These 
include prevention of cruelty, alleviation of misery, and democratization of 
illegitimate hierarchies.88 Similarly, Balkin thinks the answer to nihilism 
lies in transcendental values that flow from the "wellsprings of the human 
soul"89-values that would support, among other things, defense of the 
weak. On the other hand, it's pretty difficult to find serious agnostic schol­
arship advocating rape or pillage or what have you. 
Finally, the apparent conservatism of doubt raises fears in some minds 
of a macropolitical nature. It seems that we can hardly protect ourselves 
from tyrants and mass abominations and so on if we have no mass con­
sciousness about right and wrong-doubt seems to leave us intellectually 
defenseless against evil. If another Hitler comes along, what will the agnos­
tic do? Acquiesce, because resistance cannot be said to be "Right"? 
Well, no. In fact, in a certain sense, principle itself is the very culprit. 
Evil principles can stir the masses just as can other principles. Hider, I 
might point out, did not inflame the Nazis with doubt, but with ideals. 
Indeed, it often seems that bizarre and malevolent prescriptions flow not 
from agnostic distrust of theory, but from principled theories. Witness 
Judge Posner's apparently erstwhile view that, as a consequence of his 
detailed and systematic economic conception of justice, people who are so 
mentally feeble as to be unable to support themselves should be left to die.90 
Oddly enough, a major purpose of Posner's The Economics ofJustice was 
to overcome this very criticism as applied to an early precursor of the eco­
nomic analysis of law-the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham. Like 
Posner, Bentham set up an ostensibly principled political philosophy­
he argued that society should take whichever course maximizes aggregate 
"happiness." It was precisely this principle, however, that led Bentham to 
claims that today smack of great cruelty-for example, that all beggars 
87. Singer, supra note 10, at 8-9. 
88. See id. at 67--68. 
89. Balkin, supra note 43, at 1139. 
90. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 76. 
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should be imprisoned because their loss of happiness would be outweighed 
by the gain in happiness to those who object to the sight of beggars.91 
The point is that principles are, in the agnostic view, of dubious value. 
Much evil in history can be blamed on them; I for one think that evil 
principles can be attacked as effectively through the agnostic's visceral, 
atheoretical, personal sense of right and wrong as through any principled 
92 
response. 
B. The Structure of Doubt and the Mismatch of Theory and Reality 
Our belief in the necessity of explaining things exposes perhaps the 
most interesting and illuminating implication of the entire debate. We 
constantly search for theories to explain social phenomena, even though it is 
not at all clear that we live in a world amenable to theories. It seems to me 
that that particular human quality is potentially the key to understanding 
our fear of doubt and suggests ways to free nihilism from its hopeless cast. 
As mentioned above, a theory is an attempt to use the world's redun­
dancy to explain the world simply. 93 But there is reason to believe that, at 
least in areas of social science concern, the redundancies we seek either do 
not exist or, at least, when they do exist their complexity places them 
beyond our reach as tools to explain the world. This is a matter of some 
concern, for there is a perception that academia has a duty to the laity, a 
duty of guidance and advice on issues of academic specialty. Thus, if our 
theories fail as useful guides for life and policy, it seems that the lay public 
has been cast adrift to fumble around at its own peril. It seems, then, that 
the world is in a pretty sorry state. In this regard, I again turn to Alexander 
and his view that we cannot adequately control the world about us by way 
of ex ante ordering. For that reason, I think it is really only academics who 
are in such a state. Nihilism only seems bad because of the emphasis we 
place on theory. But, in fact, it has nothing to do with the external world; 
it impugns our purely intellectual projects, but not necessarily anything 
else. The world seems to get along without falling apart, even though we 
cannot for the life of us seem to come up with robust explanations of things. 
Are we seriously to believe that the difference between natural law and 
91. See Jeremy Bentham, Tracts on Poor Laws and Pauper Management, in 8 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 361, 401 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843). See generally 
POSNER, supra note 59, at 31-47. 
92. Rorty makes a similar point. See RORTY, supra note 4, at 53 (arguing that the Nazis 
could not have been opposed by way of reason, by showing them that "freedom" is a superior value 
to their own). 
93. See supra Part I. 
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positivism, for example, ever made any difference to the world at large ?94 Is 
there any reason to believe that important decision makers pay any atten­
tion to jurisprudence or legal theory generally? Indeed, an important 
insight of modem doubtful scholarship has been that, even though legal 
scholarship justifies itself as a service to lawyers and judges, it seems that, 
in fact, no one is listening. 95 And if even those decision makers trained in 
the law are not listening, there is hardly any reason to believe that legal 
scholarship could have any significant influence on the world outside the 
academy. 
Thus, the fear that we will not be able to get along because we are not 
able to explain things is probably not worth worrying about. In fact, for 
what it is worth, I think it is arrogant in a sense to assume that we can 
explain the world in any useful way. Our real hope lies simply in living in 
the world and working as thinkers and doers without the possibility of 
robust generalizable explanations. And, frankly, I think it should be fairly 
obvious that that is something we already know how to do. Charles 
Lindblom, for example, many years ago set out a very compelling model of 
decision making in which the actor is forced to make do with limited 
resources, time, and epistemic capacity.96 
V. CONSEQUENCES 
Pierre Schlag explains that the legal academy has long sustained itself 
on the metaphor of the court of appeals judge as the law professor's alter 
ego.97 That is, the traditional explanation of the value of legal scholarship 
has been that it aids the appellate bench by clarifying doctrinal issues and 
providing guidance for their proper resolution. Even now, at a time when 
so-called doctrinal scholarship has all but disappeared, the general belief 
persists (although perhaps it is waning) that the basic purpose of scholarly 
inquiry and debate is to influence legal outcomes. Even as this particular 
self -image of the law professor fades, the strange law school culture it 
94. I choose this example, of course, because legal philosophers have thought the distinc­
tion makes a very big difference in the real world-witness the Hart-Fuller debate. See Lon 
L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); 
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
Although Hart, Fuller, and others have thought this distinction important, many others since 
have called it irrelevant. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 228-39 (arguing that the "lawful­
ness" of the Nuremburg tribunal, the nub of the conflict between Hart and Fuller, was 
meaningless). 
95. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 60, at 406-07; Schlag, supra note 45, at 419. 
96. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 
(1959). Highly recommended. 
97. See Schlag, supra note 45, at 420. 
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engendered remains. In the classroom, we proceed under an unspoken 
assumption of determinacy that no one really believes-not even the 
students, most of the time-but that we recognize as necessary in order to 
talk aboJ.It doctrine coherently .98 Once in practice, lawyers relax the 
assumption greatly in order to serve their clients, proceeding generally on a 
sort of Holmesian-prediction approach to law. Thus, "pragmatism is the 
implicit working theory of most good lawyers."99 However, it is not the 
working theory of the law school or most legal scholarship. I think this fact 
may be explained by the need of legal scholars to justify their project. 
Thus, one final fear remains surrounding nihilism, and I think it 
largely explains the opposition to agnosticism in the legal academy. It is 
this: If agnosticism is the best that we can do as humans, then nonagnostic 
legal scholarship begins to seem quite banal. If legal theory cannot make 
"better" law or produce determinate outcomes, then it seems that the study 
of law is hardly its own intellectual pursuit, and law schools become (or 
perhaps should become) mere vocational academies for the training of 
technicians-a frightening prospect for many in the academy. It is inher­
ently demoralizing to imagine that one's own work is not of significance 
beyond the walls of the law school. Indeed, as has been explained 
repeatedly elsewhere, our modern conception of law as a regular, theorizable 
phenomenon seems to have originated in part in Dean Langdell's fear that 
law cannot be studied as an independent discipline and thus has no place in 
. . 100the umvers1ty. 
But, again, it seems to me that this fear is merely the product of unre­
alistic expectations for human capacity to theorize about social phenomena. 
98. 	 As Paul Campos writes of his own experience in the Classroom: 
Before the tables, elevated and exposed, the gatekeeper of the law grasps both sides of a 
narrow lectern .... [T]he texts he wields with such apparent confidence are thought to 
contain nothing less than the law itself.... (O]ne question reverberates repeatedly to 
every corner of the classroom: Is this case correctly decided? The students hesitate, stum­
ble, prevaricate. "On the one hand ...." The gatekeeper favors them with an indulgent 
smile. Yet beneath that smile, beneath that confident manner, a remorseful conscience, 
agenbite of inwit, eats away at his soul. For in all truth, the gatekeeper has come to 
know that he does not even understand his own question. 
Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178, 2178 (1996). 
99. Grey, supra note 4, at 1590. 
100. 	 See Schlag, supra note 45. Dean Langdell said that 
1 have tried to do my part towards making the teaching and the study of law in that 
school worthy of a university .... To accomplish these objects, so far as they depended 
upon the law school, it was indispensable to establish at least two things-that law is a 
science, and that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed 
books. 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. ll8, 123-24 
(1887), quoted in Schlag, supra note 45, at 419. 
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It is the Langdellian emulation of the physical sciences that Friedrich 
August von Hayek long ago called the mistake of "scientism"-a belief that 
the social sciences can and should be modeled on the hard sciences.101 The 
danger, he thought, was in believing that 
what looks superficially like the most scientific procedure is often the 
most unscientific ... in these fields there are definite limits to what 
we can expect science to achieve [because when] essential complex­
ity of an organized kind prevails, [we] cannot acquire the full knowl­
edge which would make mastery of the events possible.102 
Hayek thought that our best alternative was "to use what knowledge [we] can 
achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but 
rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in 
the manner in which the gardener does for his plants."103 
Hayek was writing about the econometric study of economic phenom­
ena-a sophisticated and highly routinized application of statistical theory. 
Thus, he felt that even rigorously quantitative social science cannot hope 
to be more than rhetorical. Similarly, it could be said that the hard sciences 
are essentially rhetorical, insofar as they rely on arguments that the human 
links in their chains of proofs and inferences are not faulty. Human scien­
tists run tests, interpret data, and formulate underlying hypotheses. Thus, 
no science can fully overcome our own weaknesses as humans. We should 
expect no more from legal scholarship. Legal theory, like theory in other 
disciplines, is at best a rhetorical tool; however, the fact that it may never 
render determinate answers to concrete controversies is not necessarily of 
such great significance. 
Thus, the problems of nihilism do not mean that we should throw out 
the scholarly baby with the nonagnostic bathwater. I have sought in this 
Essay to show that the consequence of our doubtful existence-nihilism-is 
just not so bad; it is okay to doubt. Consider again the physical sciences. It 
seems to me that physics and chemistry are ultimately only arguments, 
though arguments for which we can amass a great deal of convincing evi­
dence. Nevertheless, we operate in the physical world by way of powerful 
and sophisticated technology. Thus, while we can't be sure if some proposi­
tion of physics is right, we can rest easy that a bridge built on physical the­
101. See Friederich August von Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, in THE EssENCE OF 
HAYEK 266, 266-67 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) (quoting Friedrich August 
von Hayek, Scientism and the Study of Society, 9 ECONOMICA 267 (1942)). 
102. Id. at 272-73. 
103. Id. at 276. In a similar context, Herbert Hove.nkamp argues that economic theory "is 
rhetorical: we use it to tell consistent and relevant stories that make sense out of the world we 
face." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 74 (1994) (arguing about the proper role of economic theory in antitrust law). 
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ory is still a bridge and we can drive our cars across it. Law, I think, bears a 
relationship to philosophy similar to the relationship between engineering 
and physics. The bridge might collapse because the theory underlying its 
construction was inadequate to the real-world circumstances that arose; fur­
thermore, bridges will always collapse sometimes. It does not follow, 
though, that we should stop making bridges. 
In summary, I think the agnostic view results in three related conclu­
sions. First of all, notwithstanding nihilism, I think we potentially can do 
what Rorty calls "edifying" scholarship.104 Hannah Arendt expressed the idea 
somewhat differently when she noted: 
[T)hinking is always result-less. That is the difference between 
"philosophy" and science: Science has results, philosophy never. 
Thinking starts after an experience of truth has struck home, so to 
speak.... This notion that truth is the result of thought is very old 
and goes back to ancient classical philosophy, possibly to Socrates 
himself. If I am right and it is a fallacy, then it probably is the oldest 
fallacy of Wes tern philosophy .105 
On the other hand, to the extent that the reader hopes for a means of 
doing constructive scholarship without problematic assumptions, this Essay is 
a failure. One cannot set out to find answers without tangling with the 
nasty problems of nihilism and, as I have explained, I don't think we can 
tangle with nihilism. 
However, that observation leads me to what I consider the basic 
purpose of this Essay: the preceding failure just does not matter that much. 
This is so, I submit, because the agnostic's "failure" is not the result of 
weaknesses in his argument, but of our particular epistemic circumstances. 
That being the case, our best option is not to sit around and moan about 
it, but to take what we have and make the best of it. 
This, then, is the real, underlying essence of the agnostic observation, 
which is at once frustrating and transcendently edifying: philosophers cannot 
explain everything. I think there probably are real things we can do in the 
real world-like policy making and personal decisions-we just don't know 
how to describe them on paper. From one point of view, I imagine, this 
observation probably seems like yet another failure. I have done my best, 
however, to show in these pages that it is a success. 
104. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See generally RORTY, supra note 12, at 
357-72. 
105. Letter from Hannah Arendt to Mary McCarthy (Aug. 20, 1954), in BETWEEN FRIENDS: 
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HANNAH ARENDT AND MARY MCCARTHY 1949-1975, at 24-25 
(Carol Brightman ed., 1995), quoted in David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 52 (1996). 
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Thus, I envision a sort of compromise. I think that scholarly research 
and debate should continue, but under more realistic expectations of what 
humans can accomplish. In particular, we should get over our fetish for 
objectivity and determinacy; they would be very useful if we could find 
them, but, in the meanwhile, it seems that our search for them has been 
wasteful and somewhat foolish. Most importantly, fears about doubt should 
be let go. At this point in our intellectual history, they seem simply naive, 
and we should bid farewell to the days when legal scholars were ostracized 
for questioning the objectivity of morality or the possibility of right legal 
outcomes. I think the chief benefit of such a compromise will be greater 
humility in academic discourse. Humility could bring an end to unrealistic 
claims to knowledge that seem in many ways harmful. 
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